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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






. Case No. 18101 
WALTER DELAND, et al., . . 
Defendant-Respondant. . • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
... 
This is a custody action between the stepfather and 
family of the deceased mother of a child against the natural 
father following the death of the mother. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial, the court ruled that custody which had 
remained with the stepfather after the death of the mother 
should be awarded to the natural father subject to rights of 
visitation in the maternal grandparents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Richard Vigor, Jeremy Cooper's stepfather, 
seeks reversal of the ruling of the trial court and remand for 
reconsideration of this case under the proper legal standard 
which appellant believes will result in an award of custody to 
himself. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ST.~TEMENT OF FACTS 
was 
Jeremy Cooper, 
born on July 22, 
the child whose custody is in issue, 
197 3, as the issue of the marriage of 
respondent and Lisa DeLand Vigor. (R. 2, 6-10) The marriage 
between respondent and Lisa ended on May 19, 1975 (R. 6-10) and 
custody of Jeremy was awarded to Lisa. (R. 6-7.) Jeremy 
resided with Lisa after the divorce and when Lisa married 
appellant on July 24, 1980, appellant, Jeremy and Lisa resided 
together as a family. (R. 3). Lisa died on October 13, 1980 




and appellant initiated an action for guardianship 
12-25). This was preliminarily considered by Judge 
October 30, 1980, and he left temporary custody of 
Jeremy with the appellant, awarded respondent specific visita-
tion and directed a custody evaluation be performed by Francis 
Purdie of the Division of Family Services. (R. 35, 36, 
52-54). 
The custody recommendation of Francis Purdie was for 
the placement of Jeremy with his stepfather, appellant herein, 
Richard Vigor, who was thereafter determined to be the psycho-
logical parent of Jeremy Cooper by Dr. Janice Sargent. The 
reports and testimony of both of these witnesses was that it 
would be in Jeremy's best interest to reside with appellant. 
(Supplemental Record). There was conflicting testimony about 
-2-
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whether or not respondent had visited with Jeremy after the 
divorce and what custody action was in Jeremy's best interest. 
Defendants (appellant and Deland family members) 
asserted that appellant very rarely visited with Jeremy until 
October of 1980 when a regular visitation schedule was estab-
lished by Judge Banks (R. 6, 52-54) and this was contested by 
respondent. (R. 5). 
After examining the various psychological reports sub-
mitted, the trial court specifically determined that neither 
the appellant nor the natural father were unfit persons to have 
custody of Jeremy Cooper. (R. 109). The court ruled, however, 
that under the decisions of this Court in In Re Parental Rights 
of Consuelo Castillo, Utah, 632 P.2d 855 (1981), appellant 
could establish a right to custody of Jeremy only by establish-
. 
ing that respondant was unfit by clear and convincing evidence 
(R. 110). Applying that rationale, the Court determined that 
evidence of a clear and convincing nature has not been pre-
sented and therefore custody would have to be awarded to 
respondent. (R. 111). 
Mr. Cooper responded to this decision by taking Jeremy 
from school which appellant discovered only when· Jeremy did not 
return home at the end of the day. Mr. Vigor and members of 
the DeLand family then determined that it would be in Jeremy's 
best interest not to be pingponged around and appellant filed 
this appeal rather than pursue the matter further in the Dis-
trict Court. (R: 116.) 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
IN DETERMINING CUSTODY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
REQUIRED TO ACT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF 
CHILD 
When determining custody of children, this Court has 
repeatedly declared that the trial courts in Utah must act in 
the best interest of each child whose custody is in issue. 
Walton v. Koffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946), Miller v. 
Miller, 8 Utah 2d 290, 333 P.2d 945 (1959), Baldwin v. Nielsen, 
170 P.2d 179 (Utah 1946), Application of Conde, 10 Utah 2d 25, 
347 P.2d 859 (1959). This rule was restated as part of the 
examination of underlying law in In Re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 
at 856. However, that decision was misconstrued and misapplied 
by the trial court in this matter. In Castillo, this Court 
articulated tests to be applied in permanent deprivation of 
parental rights proceedings maintained under the Juvenile Court 
Act. They were not to be applied to a case invoking custody. 
That error must be corrected by this Court. 
In its Memorandum Opinion the trial court stated: 
In addressing appellant's contentions, we 
note our agreement with certain propositions 
essayed in her behalf. The first is that we 
have no reservation in agreeing that a child 
is not a mere pawn of the state to be dealt 
with solely on the basis of what public 
officials, or even the court, may believe to 
be in a child's best interest, without giv-
ing most serious consideration to the rights 
of the natural parent in his child. High 
among the ideals of individual liberty which 
we consider essential in our free society 
are those which protect the sanctity of 
one's home and family. 
-4-
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It is true that in controversies involving 
the well-being of children, this Court and 
others have frequently said that the best 
interest of children is of paramount import-
ance. We can see no useful purpose here in 
rediscussing our various cases dealing with 
the problem. It is deemed sufficient to say 
in summary that we are not aware that this 
Court has ever espoused the view, and it is 
not our view, that the termination of par-
ental rights can be· decreed without giving 
serious consideration to the prior and fund-
amental right of a parent to rear his child; 
and concomitantly, of the right of the child 
to be reared by his natural parent. 
It is a matter of such comraon knowledge as 
to hardly require expression that it is in 
accordance with the natural instincts and 
customs of mankind that in most instances 
the interests of a child are best served by 
being in the custody of his natural par-
ents. As was long ago aptly stated by the 
much-respected Chancellor Kent: " •.. the 
voice of nature has pointed out the natural 
parent as the most fit and proper person" to 
rear his own child. 
The law therefore indulges a strong ore-
sumotion to that effect, and therefore, 
whatever may have heretofore been said about 
the burden of proof in such matters, due to 
the nature of that presumption, we think it 
should be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing evidence. In this case, that stand-
ard is met because the facts recited herein 
are established without any substantial 
dispute. (Emphasis added) 
( R. 110. ) In this pronouncement the trial court correctly 
examined the language of this Court without properly under-
standing the Castillo decision, 632 P.2d at 856-67. 
In Castillo the issue was not an award of custody, it 
was whether or not there was a sufficient basis for the trial 
court to permanently deprive Mrs. Castillo of care, custody and 
-5-
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control of her children under section 78-3a-48, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. This is the most extreme action that can be taken 
by the state. It was not the issue that was before the trial 
court in the instant matter and the trial court erred in apply-
ing the strict standards articulated by this court to protect 
the parent-child relationship in a simple custody dispute. 
In the instant matter the trial court was being asked 
to determine custody between the stepfather who, it was 
asserted, had become the psychological parent of the child 
because the natural parent had forfeited his rights to act as 
the custodial parent of this child through neglect of his 
parental responsibilities and the natural father who wanted to 
resume physical custody of the child. The trial court did not 
view the situation in that light, but instead turned to this 
Court's decision in Castillo and applied its standards to this 
case. This was clear error. 
The relief sought in the instant r:tatter was not that 
of parental deprivation. It was custody through guardianship 
by appellant who sought to be the primary custodial parent of 
Jeremy Cooper based on the emotional relationship that had 
grown up between them. There was no attempt to terminate 
respondent's interest in Jeremy. This would have continued as 
they had existed prior to the death of the natural mother. 
Respondent would have continued to have visitation rights, his 
residual parental rights and such rights of contact with his 
child as he wished to assert. • 
-6-
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This was argued by appellant t:::> the trial court who 
acknowledged the argument, but rejected it. (R. 110). 
Appellant would assert to this Court that there is no reason-
able basis on which the trial court could mistake a permanent 
deprivation of parental rights case for a custody case where 
the issue of permanent deprivation of parental rights was not 
even involved. Nonetheless, after stating that this was the 
argument of appellant (R. 110) the trial court rejected it and 
applied the wrong standard. 
This Court must now reverse that ruling and remand the 
matter to the trial court for an appropriate ruling under the 
correct legal standard. The trial court should also be 
directed to examine the actions that have been taken by each of 
the parties since the entry of the trial court's order to eval-
uate the actions of the parties since October 27, 1981. 
CONCT.JUSION 
The trial court in 
legal standard to decide the 
this matter applied an improper 
case before it. It utilized the 
standards articulated by this Court for testing a permanent 
deprivation of parental rights by the Juvenile Court under the 
Juvenile Court Act in a custody dispute between a stepparent 
and a natural parent. In doing so the trial court committed 
obvious legal error as no permanent deprivation of natural par-
ental rights was ever requested. 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial 
court, remand the matter for decision under the proper legal 
-7-
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standard and specifically direct the court to examine what has 
transpired since the entry of the court• 5 order so as to be 
able to gain a full picture of who is acting in the best inter-
ests of the child. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this :J.. / day of January, 
1982. 
C-£);~v.s~h-Z' 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ c::r--· 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 532-1234 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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